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Introduction
On April 20, 2010 British Petroleum (BP), a publicly owned oil and gas
company, operated an oilrig that exploded and sank, causing a seafloor oil gusher
to flow. The gusher flowed for 87 days and was capped on July 15, 2010. The oil
spill caused an estimated 3.19 million barrels of oil to leak into the Gulf of Mexico1.
The market punished BP after the incident and the stock price continually decreased
until bottoming out on June 25 after roughly a 55% decrease. As shown in figure
1, BP's stock price was severely punished by the market for the mishap and the
environmental damage that it has caused. Even relative to the Russell 3000, the
benchmark, it performed significantly worse. The Russell 3000 also experienced a
significant drop in market value in a similar time frame. After the incident, the
Russell 3000 dropped slightly under 15%, bottoming out on July 2, 2010. The
question now is, by how much and which industries were most affected?

This paper studies the effect of the oil spill on other companies within
similar markets. To do so, this study will test whether the abnormal returns are
statistically significant from the benchmark. This study looks at BP's competitors,
oil related companies, utility companies, alternative energy providers, and natural
gas providers. There are multiple possibilities regarding the abnormal returns on
each sector. Some sectors may benefit with the market using the oil spill as
motivation to invest more in different sources of energy; as BP's mechanical failure
is highlighted, investors may choose to raise expectations for companies that do not
rely on oil or gas, yielding a positive abnormal return. On the other hand it is safe
1
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to hypothesize that oil companies can expect a negative abnormal return, as they
are heavily connected to oil production and excavation. Utilities companies are
expected have mixed results; some utilities companies use fossil fuels provided by
large oil companies are their inputs. Other utilities may use alternate forms of
energy such as nuclear energy or coal. Therefore, assuming that the selected
utilities sample is representative of the utilities sector as a whole, a neutral result
(no abnormal returns) can be expected. With the BP oil spill causing negative
perspectives on oil, natural gas and alternative energy sources may be in higher
demand, and therefore be rewarded. Hence, a positive abnormal return may be
expected. Each industry will have a different reaction. Within the energy
companies, oil and utilities are hypothesized to suffer, while alternative energy and
natural gas providers may benefit.
This study will also see whether President Obama's remarks on the oil spill
had any effect on abnormal returns. The President acknowledging a private
institution's mishap inherently expresses the gravity of the situation and motivate
abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are measured based on the benchmark, which
will be discussed in more detail in the Empirics section.
This study will help understand the market behavior after such events. This
hypothesis will show the magnitude in which investors react to a negative shock to
a company; this study will attempt to quantify an unpredictable phenomenon. Since
the market is so unpredictable, there is no theory that states what will happen to
each individual company or sector, and the hypotheses are purely speculative. One
hypothesis that could be tested is the efficient market hypothesis, which states that
the share prices are reflective all the information available. This can be analyzed
by looking at the media coverage. A possible conclusion of BP's share price
bottoming out on June 25 can imply that all the negative news had been released,
and all the coverage released after were positive.
Literature Review
In 1995, Hamilton published a paper that observed the media coverage of
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) releases and its effect on stock price. Hamilton
found that companies reporting TRI releases experienced an abnormal return
equaling an average loss of $4.1 million in stock value for TRI firms on the day the
pollution figures were released. Hamilton uses TRI announcement to see the
impact of an environmental announcement on share prices, but also includes a
media aspect to it. He is able to quantify media, which measures available
information to the market, and concurrently analyze the level of media and share
prices. Sabet et. al. expand on Hamilton’s research my conducting a similar event
study. They implemented further research on the BP oil spill with a more industry
specific shock. Sabet et. al. look at the effects of the BP oil spill and moratoriums
on the share prices of BP and its competitors. Their study looks at a total of 214
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companies that are divided into three groups: BP subcontractors, moratorium firms,
and other firms. Moratorium firms are defined as firms that own wells that were
affected by the moratorium. Other firms are defined as firms that produce oil or
gas that did not have affected wells. They hypothesize that the entire industry will
suffer from the oil spill, but subcontractors and firms affected by the moratorium
will be most affected.
In their regression model they include explanatory variables for the market
return, 1-month treasury yield rate, the price of WTI crude oil futures, and the price
of natural gas futures. They also include a dummy variable that indicates the day
of the event. Their regression model encapsulates the fact that public oil and gas
companies are sensitive to oil price, natural gas price, and interest rates. Their
results find statistically significant and very large abnormal losses in two
companies, Cameron International and Transocean. These two companies are BP
subcontractors that were responsible for producing and implementing the blowout
preventer and were deemed most responsible for the spill. Moratorium firms and
other firms showed no abnormal returns on the day of the BP explosion. They did
not experience any abnormal returns until the moratorium announcement, in which
the moratorium firms and other firms experienced a 2.12% and .65% loss,
respectively.
The event study that I will conduct is conceptually similar, but will look at
a broader range of industries with less of a focus on post-explosion events such as
moratorium announcements. I will be looking at the explosion's effects on
companies across industries, such as alternative energy companies, whether to see
if other competing industries actually benefit or suffer from these events. Also, the
model of empirical analysis is much simpler. I will be using a simple t-test to see
whether the abnormal returns for each industry is different from 0.
Data/Empirics
All the stock price information is from Yahoo finance. Initially the oil
producers were selected through a search of BP competitors. The list was later
extended after a search of all utilities related companies on the NASDAQ website.
This search yielded a list of 300 companies. Within this list, the companies were
registered as oil providers. By adding these names, the list of oil companies was
compiled. From the same search on the NASDAQ website, the utilities companies
were selected if they had any relation to energy production or distribution. The
natural gas companies and the alternative energy companies went through the same
vetting process. The list of 300 companies was trimmed to about 150. It was further
reduced to 130 companies when the stock price information was not available, as
some of the companies in the list were not public during the incident.
The data was also divided by the time periods after the event. The data
looks at abnormal return for 8 weeks after the event. The abnormal returns are
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reported in a weekly basis. It also looks at the rest of the year (the incident to
December 31st 2010) to see whether the stock price reaches similar prices prior to
the incident to measure the market's overall forgivingness. The time element is
implemented because there may be a lag between the incident and market
responses; the market may take time to understand and assess the incident. Also,
the amount of media coverage will be a factor. If the incident initially is lightly
reported the stock price will not see too much of an affect, but as more news is
reported, the stock price reaction may be greater. The more media coverage, the
more information the market can act upon. The amount of media coverage can be
a measure of the gravity of the situation. There will be more media outlets covering
the oil spill if it is worse. Hence media coverage can act as two indicators, the level
of information the investors have and the gravity of the oil spill.

As seen in figure 2, the abnormal returns were not very volatile a few days
after the incident. Then after a week it the volatility increases and becomes most
volatile between late May and late June. Within this one month, the market was
being most responsive. This can be attributed to the market realizing the gravity of
the situation. It is also possible that this was the height of the media coverage.
Media coverage would have been helpful to better analyze the event study, but the
time lag will compensate, as the time lag component will be able to capture the time
lag of transmitted information. Also, the number of companies would ideally be
larger. Though the overall event study looks at 130 companies, some of the
industries have fewer than ideal companies. For example, the natural gas
distributors and the number of alternative energy companies may be too few to
draw concrete conclusion.
The summary statistics list the abnormal return (AR) for each industry with
different amount of time after the incident. First the daily return of each company
is calculated. The daily return is measured as follows:
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Daily Returni = Log(Pricet) - Log(Pricet-1)
(1)
Instead of taking the percent change, taking difference of the logs will make
the daily returns cumulative. The abnormal returns are calculated with respect to a
benchmark figure. The Russell 3000 is the benchmark in the study as it has 3000
companies, so no single company has a significant weight. To get the abnormal
return, I take difference between the daily return of the specific company, i, and the
benchmark:
Abnormal Returni = Daily Returni - Daily ReturnRussell 3000
(2)
To get the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) I take the sum of the
abnormal returns for the specific amount of time:
CARi = ∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝐴𝑅𝑖
(3)
There is no need to take the average, as the study is not looking at average
returns, but rather the return over a certain period of time2. To get the industry
average, I implement the following equation:
1
CARindustry = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
(4)
𝑛

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Note: The standard deviations are for the industry CAR of the corresponding week

The abnormal returns are calculated starting April 22nd. Though, this is
two days after the oil spill, according to Sabet et. al., this is the first day that an
article was published and released to the market. As a result, looking at days prior
to the 22nd should not yield any abnormal returns caused by the oil spill. The
summary statistics shows that the oil industry, represented by 27 companies, on
average had a positive CAR one week after the incident, which is contradictory to
the hypothesis. The CAR is negative for two to five weeks after the incident, which
is consistent with the hypothesis. This is reflective of the lag effect of the
information being transmitted to the market. To see whether the oil spill did
actually affect the industries more than the overall market, I conducted a t-test for
each for each industry.

2Princeton

University, “Value Relevance of Analysts’’ Earnings Forecast”
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Table 2: T-Test Results on CAR

Note: "*" 10% level of significance, "**" 5% level of significance, "***" 1% level of significance

The results indicate that the most industries do not have a statistically
significant abnormal return. The utility companies consistently, and unexpectedly
outperform the market. The hypothesis states that utilities are likely to have a
neutral response from the incident, if the utilities sample is representative of the
overall industry. This implies that the sample selected mainly consists of
competitors that benefitted from a shock in oil. In this regard, within the utilities
sector, companies do benefit from a negative shock to its competitors. Assuming
that the sample is not fully representative of the utilities industry and is
compromised more competitors such as coal or nuclear-power based companies,
part of the abnormal returns may be explained by the jump in the WTI crude oil
price. On April 19th, the floating crude oil price was $81.52. The day of the
incident, the price jumps to $82.98 and peaks on May 3rd at $86.92.3 This may
explain the short-term abnormal return the utilities, meaning that there is a clear
substitution effect. Within the utilities companies, individuals expect higher returns
from non-oil based utilities companies, due to the incident. As a result, investors
are transitioning to alternative utilities companies, possibly coal or nuclear energy.
It also makes sense that the abnormal returns last as he gravity of the situation is
becoming more and more apparent in the market. A key assumption is that the
utilities industry represented in by the sample may be composed of more non-oil
based companies. Assuming this holds, this implies that competitors, within the
utilities market, do indeed benefit from the negative shock.
On the other hand, alternative energy and natural gas companies, which
could be considered competitors and a possible substitute to oil companies, do not
show positive abnormal returns. The lack of significant difference from the
benchmark in the alternative energy sector goes against the hypothesis that a
negative shock in competing industries will be beneficial. The natural gas industry
also goes against the hypothesis and actually does worse than expected. This
implies that market did not positively adjust their expectation for cleaner and
3

U.S. Energy Information Administration
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environmentally friendly energy sources. For all industries, it makes sense that the
full year for all industries are not statistically significant as the stock prices
stabilized overtime.
The oil industry goes against our hypothesis and shows that the returns are
not abnormal and follow the Russell 3000. There is no statistical significant CAR's
in any given week within the oil industry, going against the proposed hypothesis.
This leads to the conclusion that the overall oil industry was not largely affected by
the oil spill. This is likely because smaller companies that were less affected by the
oil spill dilute the sample. The results are completely different when the analysis
specifically focuses on large, global companies that are considered to be BP's
competitors.
When looking at BP's competitors, the number of observations in the oil
production industry decreases from 31 to 9. The 9 companies being analyzed are
categorized as BP's competitors are based on Yahoo Finance and Morning Star; if
Yahoo Finance or Morning Star considers a company a competitor, it is included
in the sample, yielding a list of 9 companies. These companies are similar in size,
operation, and global reach. I hypothesize that these companies will experience a
similar punishment as BP, but not with the same magnitude, because these
companies are most likely to have similar risks as BP.
Table 3: Summary Statistics of BP's competitors with T-Test Results on CAR

Note: The numbers 1 through 8 indicate the number of weeks after the incident. The Average is CAR.
"*" signifies 10% level of significance
"**" signifies 5% level of significance
"***" signifies 1% level of significance

When looking at only large competitors, who are listed in table 3, the companies
underperform the index with statistical significance. The CAR's, listed as 'Average'
in table 3, show that there are negative statistically significant negative returns.
This follows the hypothesis that BP's peers suffer from BP's mistake. The 9
companies underperform the market by 0.91% one week after the incident. The
competitors underperform the market even more for six consecutive weeks after the
incident. This shows that the market took six weeks to fully adjust to the shock.
With regards to the efficient market theory, this shows that the market took 6 weeks
to receive and interpret the information. The largest abnormal return is observed 4
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weeks after the incident. This can be reflective of the lack of initial coverage. Once
the gravity of the situation became clear, the market reacted even more. The
analysis clearly shows that peers, similar in size and operation, are punished for
BP’s mishap.
Another event that this study looks at is the President's remarks regarding
the oil spill. The evening of June 15th, President Obama addressed the gravity of
the oil spill referring to it as, "the worst environmental disaster America has ever
faced."4 This reaction by the president should provoke a statistically significant
negative abnormal return specifically within the competitors. The test itself is
conducted in a similar way that Hamilton (1995) conducts his study. The study
looks at five days prior, the day of the announcement, and the 5 days after, which
show the immediate effect of the announcement and the lingering effects of the
announcements.
Table 4: President's Announcements on Abnormal Returns

Note:
"*" signifies 10% level of significance
"**" signifies 5% level of significance
"***" Signifies 1% level of significance

This results go against the hypothesis that the announcement should cause
negative abnormal returns. This may reflect the fact that the market had already
priced in the gravity of the situation. The President's announcement may not have
had an effect of the market's interpretation of the situation. The results show that
there is only one significant abnormal return on the day of the announcement by
the utilities companies. Like the earlier analysis, the increase in abnormal return
may be rooted from the increase in oil price. Though not a significant increase in
price, the floating WTI oil price increase 1.05% the day after the announcement,
causing the utilities to have abnormal returns of .24%. 5 The President's
announcement did not have the expected effects on the abnormal returns on BP's
competitors.
Conclusion and Summary
4
5

The White House, "Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill"
U.S. Energy Information Administration
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We provide evidence of peers experiencing abnormal returns in reaction to
the BP oil spill, particularly with respect utilities companies and BP’s direct
competitors. The question being answered is whether if a company's mishaps
punishes its peers. We can conclude that peers do get punished and that other
industries may get rewarded. This implies that the stock market is intertwined;
exogenous factors can and will affect the overall market. In this case, a negative
shock to BP caused a downward revision of expectations for direct competitors.
There are multiple layers of effects that can lead to some sort of multiplier effect;
investors may believe that the peers have similar possible risks as BP since their
operations are similar. There was also a moratorium on exploration in the Gulf of
Mexico, so if companies had exposure to that area, they would have been negatively
affected. Hence, Investors with more foresight will anticipate this downward
revision and try to sell off their shares before the share prices decrease significantly.
Lastly, investors may experience a sharp decline in the value of the share,
motivating them to sell their shares. A combination of these affects can cause a
downward steep downward revision of the share prices, causing large negative
abnormal returns.
On the other hand, utilities companies experienced a positive abnormal
return. This is sensible if we assume that the sample consists mainly of non-oil
based companies. This implies that non-oil based companies benefit from the oil
spill within the utilities market; non-oil based utilities companies are expected to
outperform the oil-based utilities companies. This is evidence of the substitution
effect. Individuals expect non-oil based utilities companies to outperform,
motivating a transition from oil-based companies to non-oil based companies.
Though utilities companies are not direct peers to BP, the oil spill indeed benefitted
them.
Future research to understand the effect on peers will be based on other
event studies. Studying other events will lead a greater understanding of market
behavior. This will test both the efficient market hypothesis and the impact of
exogenous shocks. This can be done by looking at other events such as the Valdez
oil spill. In a non-environmental context, analyzing fines on major brokers and
banks can help understand investor behavior. As a bank is fined, investors may
stay away from the finance industry as a whole. Another possible topic would be
the effect of a fast-food restaurant’s salmonella outbreak on the overall industry. A
possible way of analyzing this would be by looking at the peers’ market share value
when a large institution is penalized for malpractice.
An improvement to this event study is to add a media component a media
component like Hamilton’s (1995) analysis of TRI reports. The media variable
would have better tested the efficient market hypothesis by measuring the amount
of information available to the market. By using the media data and abnormal
returns, investor behavior and responsiveness to information can be analyzed. As
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more credible news sources report this incident, investors will begin to understand
the gravity of the situation. There are other aspects that may have led to abnormal
returns. Digging deeper into these specific issues, such as moratorium
announcements, can explain the reasoning behind the abnormal returns. Also,
better understanding of the BP oil spill timeline would help understand the
abnormal returns. For example, on May 27th, the BP oil spill was recorded as the
worst spill on U.S. history.6 By examining more specific events, investor behavior
can be analyzed. Though maybe impossible, understanding the type of investor
who sells off BP would narrow down investor behavior even more; if individuals
are more environmental, they are likely to sell off the shares. Environmental
investors may not even own BP shares to begin with, but looking at the composition
of shareholders can shed light the investor’s motivations and behaviors. Lastly,
market forgiveness is a topic of further research. This can be analyzed by looking
at the share prices after the incident to see if it reaches pre-incident levels.

6
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